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The Medieval Roots of a Contemporary Problem
Alexander Fidora
While Latin-Christian reflections on ethics are very much indebted to the Ancient 
Greek tradition, there are some salient features which clearly distinguish the medi-
eval approach. One such feature is the insistence of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
philosophers and theologians on the scientific character of ethics. Thus, ethics is no 
longer conceived of as a particular form of practical knowledge, but as a science in 
the strict sense.
In an article published in 2008 concerning the epistemological foundation of 
Thomas Aquinas’s moral philosophy, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann described a develop-
ment with significant systematic implications which had taken place in the transition 
from Antiquity to the Middle Ages.1 Aristotle had conceived of ethics primarily as 
a kind of practical knowledge which one might designate, as he did, knowledge of 
a typos or an outline. Unlike Aristotle, however, numerous medieval philosophers 
considered this kind of knowledge a scientia moralis, that is, a science.
Lutz-Bachmann elaborated: “There is an important systematic difference between 
the ancient epistemological distinction between practical knowledge as artistic 
knowledge on the one hand and theoretical knowledge as scientific knowledge on 
the other hand, and the medieval philosophers’ way of speaking of ethics as a practi-
cal science. We can identify such a choice of terminology among authors of the 
thirteenth century who had detailed knowledge of the relevant statements of Aristotle 
concerning the theory of the sciences and the theory of practical knowledge. Since 
these authors hardly distinguish themselves by an imprecise language it only makes 
sense to assume that the idea of ethics as a practical science was created deliberately 
1 Lutz-Bachmann M. (2008), “Praktisches Wissen und ‘Praktische Wissenschaft’. Zur Epistemologie der 
Moralphilosophie bei Thomas von Aquin,” in Lutz-Bachmann M. and Fidora A. (eds.), Handlung und 
Wissenschaft. Die Epistemologie der praktischen Wissenschaften im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert / Action and 
Science. The Epistemology of the Practical Sciences in the 13th and 14th Centuries, (Wissenskultur und 
gesellschaftlicher Wandel, 29) Akademie Verlag, Berlin, p. 89-96.
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and that we are dealing here with an independent notion of medieval philosophy 
which was not directly derived from Aristotle’s epistemology.”2
This transformation of the epistemological foundation of ethics had implications 
for the form of its theory as well as for its contents. In particular, these repercus-
sions concern phronêsis or prudentia, a key concept of moral philosophy. While in 
Aristotle’s notion of ethics as a kind of practical knowledge, phronêsis appears as 
a well integrated and constitutive element in reflecting on human actions, its role 
in ethics becomes doubtful if ethics is no longer thought of as a kind of practical 
knowledge, but rather as a practical science.
My aim in the following discussion is to use select authors in order to reconstruct 
how the debate about the systematic position of prudentia unfolded from the thir-
teenth to the seventeenth century against the backdrop of the development of moral 
philosophy as a science. In doing so, I will point out the significance of this debate 
for the question of the proper relationship between ethics and prudence even in the 
present day.
The Starting Point: Thomas Aquinas
The development of ethics as a science is primarily associated with the name of 
Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa theologiae as well as in other texts, Thomas goes 
well beyond his Aristotelian source and refers repeatedly to ethics as scientia moralis.
The resulting tension concerning the position of prudentia first appears in 
Quaestio 47 of the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae; in article III Thomas 
defines the object of prudence as being things singular, which, according to Aristotle, 
cannot be subject to science.
The problem becomes more explicit in the Prooemium to Quaestio 48, where 
Thomas elaborates on the different parts of prudentia. One of the relevant ques-
tions in this context is whether politics and economy should be considered parts of 
prudentia. According to Thomas, one might present to this assumption, which is 
ultimately rooted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI 8, the following objection:
Prudentia is specifically distinct (dividitur) from science (scientia). But politics, 
economics [etc.] are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of prudentia.3
2 Lutz-Bachmann, “Praktisches Wissen und ‘Praktische Wissenschaft’,” p. 92.
3 Thomas Aquinas (1895), Opera omnia iussu impensaque, ed. Leonis XIII P. M., t. VIII: Secunda secun­
dae Summae theologiae a quaestione 1 ad quaestionem LVI, Ex Typographia Polyglotta, Rome, II-II, q. 48, 
a. unic., arg. 2, p. 365: “Praeterea, prudentia dividitur contra scientiam. Sed politica, oeconomica [etc.] 
sunt quaedam scientiae. Non ergo sunt partes prudentiae.”
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This argument makes the tension between practical science and prudentia obvi-
ous. If one considers politics and economics as sciences, but prudentia as a dianoetic 
virtue which, according to Aristotle NE VI 9, is strictly distinct from the habit of 
epistêmê or scientia, it only remains that politics and economics cannot be regarded 
parts of prudentia.
In his corpus articuli, however, Thomas endorses the Aristotelian view of politics 
and economics as parts of prudentia. Thus, he emphasizes that ethics, politics and 
economics, if understood correctly, are parts of prudentia. According to Thomas, 
there is a form of prudentia
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudentia whereby a man governs a multitude 
[…]. Again, the prudentia whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various 
species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which 
is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together 
to fight, and the prudentia that governs this is called “military”. There is also the 
multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of 
a home or family, and this is ruled by “domestic prudentia”; and such again is 
the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is “regnative 
prudentia” in the ruler, and “political prudentia”, simply so called, in the subjects.4
However, this explanation, which presents a list rather than an argument, does not 
solve the problem of the objection which has been mentioned above. Likewise, the 
response to the objection contents itself with a terminological distinction:
[…] It must be noted that economics and politics are not to be taken as sciences 
here, but as kinds of prudentia.5
The Summa theologiae remains silent on the foundation of this terminological 
distinction; instead it goes on saying that “science and knowledge of the principles 
concern what is necessary, whereas art and prudence deal with what is contingent”.6 
However, we can gather some explanation of this distinction from a passage in 
Thomas’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics which is of great importance 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, co.: “Et hoc modo partes prudentiae, secundum quod proprie 
sumuntur, sunt prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum, et prudentia per quam aliquis regit multitudinem, 
quae differunt specie […], et iterum prudentia quae est multitudinis regitiva dividitur in diversas spe­
cies secundum diversas species multitudinis. Est autem quaedam multitudo adunata ad aliquod speciale 
negotium, sicut exercitus congregatur ad pugnandum, cuius regitiva est prudentia militaris. Quaedam vero 
multitudo est adunata ad totam vitam, sicut multitudo unius domus vel familiae, cuius regitiva est prudentia 
oeconomica; et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cuius quidem directiva est in principe regnativa, in 
subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta.”
5 Ibid., ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod oeconomica et politica non accipiuntur hic secundum quod sunt 
scientiae; sed secundum quod sunt prudentiae quaedam.”
6 Ibid., q. 47, a. 5, co.: “Scientia et intellectus sunt circa necessaria; ars autem et prudentia circa contingentia.”
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for his view of prudentia in general. Here, he addresses the relationship between 
prudentia and appetitus:
We must consider that prudentia is not only in the reason but has a function 
likewise in the appetitive faculty. Therefore, everything mentioned here (i.e., ethics, 
economics and politics) is a species of prudentia, to the extent that it does not reside 
in the reason alone but has ramifications in the appetitive faculty. Inasmuch as 
they are exclusively in the reason they are called certain kinds of practical science 
(scientiae practicae), viz., ethics, economics and politics.7
Much more clearly than his contemporaries, Thomas had recognized the 
exceptional position of prudentia which mediates between reason and appetite.8 
Accordingly, ethics, economics and politics fall into two categories: insofar as they 
concern rational knowledge only, they should be referred to as “scientific”; but inso-
far as they coexist with prudentia in the appetite, they are “prudential”.
Ultimately, this insight determines the entire architecture of the Summa theo­
logiae. The division of the Secunda pars into two books, namely Ia-IIae and IIa-
IIae, can be explained in such a manner. Concerning the general disposition of the 
Secunda pars, Thomas wrote: 
But because operations and acts are concerned with particular things, consequently 
all knowledge concerned with action (operativa scientia) is only complete 
(perficitur) if it takes account of particular things (in particulari consideratione). 
The study of ethics, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the 
general principles; and secondly particular matters.9
Thomas thus determines the Prima secundae as the proper place for ethics as a 
science. Still, this decision did not lead him to make a sharp division between the 
Secunda secundae, including prudentia, on the one hand, and ethics as a science on 
the other hand. Thomas rather explicitly identifies the subject of the Secunda secun­
dae as the completion of the science of ethics: “operativa scientia in particulari 
consideratione perficitur”.
7 Thomas Aquinas (1969), Opera omnia iussu impensaque, ed. Leonis XIII P. M., t. XLVII/2: Sententia 
libri Ethicorum, Ad Sanctae Sabinae, Rome, lib. VI, lec. 7, p. 357: “Est autem considerandum, quod sicut 
supra dictum est, prudentia non est in ratione solum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu. Omnia ergo de quibus 
hic fit mentio, in tantum sunt species prudentiae, inquantum non in ratione sola consistunt, sed habent 
aliquid in appetitu. Inquantum enim sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quaedam scientiae practicae, scilicet 
ethica, oeconomica et politica.”
8 Concerning this issue see, for example, Wieland G. (1981), Ethica – Scientia practica. Die Anfänge der 
philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des 
Mittelalters, n.F., 21) Aschendorff, Münster, p. 118.
9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 6, prooemium: “Sed quia operationes et actus circa singu­
laria sunt, ideo omnis operativa scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur conside­
ratio quia est humanorum actuum, primo quidem tradenda est in universali, secundo vero in particulari.”
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To conclude this section, one can say that, although Thomas recognized the ten-
sion between ethics as a science and prudentia, he did not wish to abandon the 
central role of prudentia within ethics. He rather endeavoured to establish a balance 
between ethics as a science and prudentia in which the two coexist as being directed 
at the same aim.
The Fourteenth Century: John Buridan
What appears in Thomas Aquinas’s meta-ethical discussion in form of a side remark 
became the subject of separate debates in the fourteenth century.
Particular mention in this context deserves John Buridan, who dedicated a specific 
Quaestio in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics to the relationship between 
prudentia and scientia moralis: “Utrum prudentia sit idem habitus cum scientia 
morali tradita libro ethicorum, politicorum et oeconomicorum” (lib. VI, q. 17).
Buridan presents two arguments against the claim that prudentia is identical with 
the scientia moralis which Aristotle describes in his books on practical philosophy. 
The first argument runs as follows:
Aristotle distinguishes (distingit) in Book VI [of the Nicomachean Ethics] prudentia 
from scientia. Therefore, there is no science which is identical with prudentia.10
Buridan adds further arguments to this point, which had already been crucial 
for Thomas. By and large, these additional arguments are derived from the contem-
porary debate about the connexio virtutum, which concerned the relationship and 
intrinsic connection between the virtues that Aristotle had established with the help 
of phronêsis:
Prudentia is one and the same for all actions: Aristotle thus demonstrates that 
all virtues are connected with each other […]. The sciences, however, which are 
transmitted in these [i.e. Aristotle’s] books, are many and distinct from one another. 
Therefore, they are not the same habit as prudentia.11
This explanation as well as other, related arguments may offer an indication 
regarding the discussion to which the seventeenth Quaestio presented a critical 
contribution, namely with respect to Buridan’s predecessor, Ockham. The latter had 
10 Johannes Buridanus (1513), Super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, Ponceto Le 
Preux, Paris, [reprint Frankfurt a. M., 1968], fol. 132va: “Sexto huius distingit Aristoteles prudentiam 
contra scientiam. Ergo nulla scientia est eadem cum prudentia.”
11 Ibid., fol. 132va: “Prudentia est una tantum omnium agibilium, per hoc enim Aristoteles probat virtutes 
morales invicem esse connexas [...], sed scientiae in dictis libris traditae sunt plures et ab invicem distinc­
tae. Ergo non sunt idem habitus cum prudentia.”
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indeed explored the relationship between prudentia and scientia moralis in his trea-
tise De connexione virtutum12.
In his reply, Buridan offers a complex argument. Thus, in a first step one should 
decide whether the habit of Aristotle’s Ethics is identical with the habit of science or 
rather with that of prudentia. In order for this decision to be made, one has to deter-
mine the specific difference between scientia on the one hand and ars and prudentia 
on the other hand. Buridan surveys several potential solutions to this problem. The 
first attempt to define the specific difference focuses on the distinction between “uni­
versalis” and “singularis”: scientia is always concerned with the universal, whereas 
ars and prudentia deal with the singular. Whenever the latter employ universal 
propositions, they function as phenomena subordinate to scientia. Since ethics is 
concerned with general statements, it corresponds to the habit of science rather than 
to prudentia.13 The second position is analogous to the first one: the explanation for 
the specific difference between scientia on the one hand and ars and prudentia on 
the other hand is that the former is concerned with necessary principles whereas the 
latter deal with contingent actions. A large part of ethics, however, concerns things 
which are necessarily the way they are. Hence, ethics is a habit of science and does 
not correspond to the habit of prudentia.14
Buridan’s own point of view assumes a model of ethical understanding over 
several stages:
It is sufficient to know those things which are beyond our control with general 
reasons. Therefore, no ars or prudentia is concerned with them, but only science. 
Such an understanding, however, is not sufficient for those things which we can 
control. In these cases one has to descend to the particular knowledge (notitia 
singularis). This is because we do not only want to know these things, but rather 
do them and realize them in an active way. Therefore, there has to be a habit for the 
singular which we refer to as ars or prudentia.15
Along similar lines as Thomas, also Buridan understands prudentia and the habit 
of science to be complementary aspects of ethics as it is presented in Aristotle’s 
12 See William of Ockham (2008), Über die Verknüpfung der Tugenden, tr. Leppin V., (Herders Bibliothek 
der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 16) Herder, Freiburg, p. 34: “[...] prudentia proprie dicta secundum inten­
tionem Philosophi, prout distinguitur a scientia morali.”
13 See Johannes Buridanus, Super decem libros Ethicorum, fol. 132vb.
14 See ibid., fol. 132vb-133ra.
15 Ibid., fol. 133ra: “Sufficit cognoscere secundum universales rationes ea, quae sub opere nostro non cadunt; 
propter quod de illis nec erit ars nec prudentia, sed tantum scientia. Sic autem cognoscere non sufficit ea, 
quae subsunt operi nostro, sed oportet ad eorum singularem notitiam descendere, propter hoc quod ea 
volumus non solum scire, sed facere vel agere. […] Oportet alium de ipsis habere habitum in singulari, 
quem vocamus artem vel prudentiam.”
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writings. According to Buridan, ethics combines both habits: it is science, but it is 
also prudentia:
If prudentia is complete, it contains the habit of ethics or a habit similar to it as a 
part of itself. For prudentia is not a distinct habit from the habit which allows us 
to know what to do and how to do it with respect to the aim of living a good and 
happy life […]. The above-mentioned books [of Aristotle] do not teach any lesson 
different from this.16
Sure enough, Buridan thus quite deliberately modifies the nature of the problem. 
Here he presents an answer to the question whether prudentia includes the habit 
which derives from Aristotle’s ethical writings. To this question, his answer is clearly 
affirmative.
However, it becomes obvious that the problem which constituted the starting 
point has, in fact, not been solved, when Buridan tries to respond to the objection 
mentioned at the beginning, which draws on Aristotle’s sharp distinction between 
prudentia and scientia. Here, the only possible solution for Buridan is to refer to a 
linguistic difference:
Concerning the first objection, one can say that no scientia is identical with 
prudentia, if these terms are understood in a strict manner. If we use them, however, 
in a common sense, they are synonymous.17
If one does not want to reduce Buridan’s explanation to the following contradic-
tion: the nature of ethics is scientia, the nature of ethics is prudentia, but the nature 
of prudentia is not scientia, the only possible conclusion which allows to resolve 
the apparent tension18 runs as follows: apparently, Buridan’s understanding of the 
project of a philosophical ethics was broader than that of an ethics as science, but 
also broader than that of ethics as prudentia. According to him, philosophical ethics 
is an enterprise which relies in equal measure on both parts.
16 Johannes Buridanus, Super decem libros Ethicorum, fol. 133va: “Ita quod prudentia, si sit perfecta, 
continet in se habitum illum vel consimilem tamquam partem quandam ipsius, quoniam prudentia non est 
alius habitus quam secundum quem scimus, quid et quomodo sit agendus ad bene vivendum et feliciter […] 
sed illi libri nihil aliud docent.”
17 Ibid., fol. 133va: “Ad primam dicendum est, quod nulla scientia est prudentia, quando proprie utimur istis 
nominibus, sed quando communiter utimur illis, sunt nomina synonyma.”
18 I believe that this tension remains unresolved in Gerhard Krieger’s very detailed interpretation. See 
Krieger G. (1986), Der Begriff der praktischen Vernunft nach Johannes Buridanus, (Beiträge zur 
Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.F., 21) Aschendorff, Münster, p. 252-257.
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On the Threshold to Modernity: Francisco de Vitoria
While medieval philosophers debated the relationship between prudentia and scien­
tia moralis by making an effort to overcome the immanent difficulties and to establish 
a balance which integrates the two elements, the problem was addressed in a more 
radical manner at the beginning of the early modern period.
The philosopher and theologian Francisco de Vitoria from Salamanca deserves 
particular mention in this context, especially his commentary on the Summa theolo­
giae. In article V of Quaestio 47 concerning the Secunda secundae, he explores the 
relationship between prudentia and scientia moralis. In the original text, Thomas 
discusses in this article whether prudentia is a special virtue (virtus specialis). In his 
response to this question, Thomas explains that prudentia is different both from the 
other dianoetic virtues, among them scientia, and from the ethical virtues.
Vitoria takes on these distinctions in his commentary on Aquinas. He remarks, 
however, that Thomas’s analysis remained incomplete since
it appears that Thomas does not distinguish between prudentia and synderesis […] 
nor with regard to the scientia moralis, which we study in the books of the Ethics.19
In the following argument, Vitoria discusses these two issues in further detail. 
He asserts that even though synderesis, like prudentia, is concerned with action, its 
object is something necessary (i.e., self-evident principles), whereas prudentia is 
only concerned with what is contingent. Vitoria continues to argue that prudentia is 
different from scientia moralis for the same reason since
scientia moralis is concerned with what is necessary even though its objects are not 
in the same manner necessary as the objects of mathematics are necessary. They 
are rather necessary like the objects of physics where those things are considered 
necessary that occur usually in a certain way.20
Vitoria illustrates the necessary character of the scientia moralis with the help of 
examples such as the following sentence: No innocent person should be killed. It is 
in this sense that the scientia moralis is concerned with what is necessary, whereas 
prudentia is concerned with what is contingent, conducing to “opiniones, quae 
19 Francisco de Vitoria (1932), Comentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Tomás. Vol. II: De caritate 
et prudentia (qq. 23­56), ed. Beltrán de Heredia V., San Esteban, Salamanca, p. 360: “Videtur quod 
Doctor non ponit distinctionem inter prudentiam et synderesim [...], nec a scientia morali quam studemus 
in Ethicis.”
20 Ibid.: “Quia scientia moralis est de necessariis, licet non sint illa eo modo necessaria quo scientiae mathe­
maticae, sed eo modo quo scientiae physicae, in quibus dicitur illud necessarium, quod ut in plurimum 
contingit.”
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contingenter sunt”,21 i.e., to contingent views, and not to scientia. Ergo, “a scientia 
morali […] distinguitur prudentia”.22
It is noteworthy that in order to underscore his interpretation, of all authori-
ties, Vitoria refers to Thomas Aquinas, specifically the above-quoted passage from 
Quaestio 48, and to Buridan and his Quaestio 17 which has just been discussed. 
Yet, although Vitoria appears to align himself into an existing tradition, one cannot 
ignore that he remodels the explanations of these two authors in order to support his 
own position, whether he did that deliberately or not. For while these two distinguish 
themselves by harmonizing the ambition of ethics as a science with the significance 
of prudentia, the scholar from Salamanca resolutely decides to exclude prudence 
from ethics.
Josef Pieper still expressed his surprise “that the Spaniard Francisco de Vitoria, 
who laid a new foundation for the study of Saint Thomas in the second quarter of 
the sixteenth century, pays disproportionately little attention to the discussion of pru-
dence in his great commentary on the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologicae”.23 
Taking my analysis above into consideration, however, it should not surprise at all 
that prudentia receives so little attention in Vitoria’s work as well as from other rep-
resentatives of Spanish Scholasticism. The conflict which had arisen in the Middle 
Ages, when practical knowledge was transformed into a practical science, led to a 
definite degradation of prudentia in the sixteenth century, clearly distinguishing it 
from the kind of knowledge which was identified with Aristotle’s ethics. One of the 
reasons which may account for this development could be the new and radicalized 
concept of contingency which was put forward by John Duns Scotus.24
Ethics as a Theoretical Science: John of Saint Thomas
This development constitutes the backdrop against which John of Saint Thomas 
presented an argument that bears its own problems. Concerning our topic, the 
seventeenth-century Portuguese author, who is considered one of Thomas’s most 
significant commentators, wrote in his Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus:
21 Francisco de Vitoria, Comentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Tomás, p. 360.
22 Ibid.
23 See Pieper J. (1947), Über die Klugheit, 3rd ed., Summa Verlag, Olten, p. 92-93.
24 I owe this observation to Ludger Honnefelder. See his article: Honnefelder L. (2008), “Universale Norm 
und kontingente Lebensform: Die mittelalterlichen Deutungen des von Natur aus Rechten,” in id. (ed.), 
Woher kommen wir? Ursprünge der Moderne im Denken des Mittelalters, Berlin University Press, Berlin, 
p. 272-304, esp. p. 271.
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There are two ways of understanding the scientia moralis. On the one hand it can 
be understood as including prudentia, on the other hand it can be understood as 
excluding it and that it concerns the knowledge of virtues only in a theoretical 
manner (speculando). In the former case, prudentia grants it a practical character 
and it realizes the principle “Good deeds are to be done” in a practical manner. 
[…] If, however, the scientia moralis excludes prudentia and is concerned with 
the object of virtues through definitions and distinctions only, it is theoretical 
(speculativa) […] as one can see in the Ethics and in the entire Prima secundae. It 
is therefore perfectly possible that someone be an excellent philosophical ethicist 
and theologian, yet at the same time an imprudent sinner.25
This position, which had a significant impact on Jacques Maritain, takes on the 
conclusion Vitoria had drawn by excluding prudentia from ethics.26 This holds at 
least for the ethics of the Nicomachean Ethics as well as that described in the Prima 
secundae. It seems that the Secunda secundae is not taken into account. Johannes 
may respond here to the distinction which Thomas himself had made concerning 
the two parts of the Secunda pars. As a result of this exclusion, ethics is defined as a 
speculative or theoretical science.
A second passage which appears slightly later in the Cursus Philosophicus 
Thomisticus in the section “De unitate et distinctione scientiarum”, contains an even 
more poignant argument:
Insofar as the scientia moralis is understood in a practical manner, it is identical with 
prudentia and does thus not belong to the theoretical habits, which are discussed 
here. If, however, it is understood in a theoretical sense as an ethical science which 
is concerned with the nature of [the] virtues, it belongs to philosophy and forms 
part of it. For insofar as the latter deals with the soul, it also has to address moral 
actions.27
25 John of Saint Thomas (1930), Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus. Logica, ed. Reiser B., Marietti, Turin, 
Secunda pars, q. 1, a. 4, vol. I, p. 276: “Scientia moralis potest dupliciter considerari: Uno modo, ut includit 
prudentiam, alio modo, ut eam excludit et solum versatur circa cognitionem virtutum speculando. Primo 
modo habet rationem practici ex parte prudentiae, quam includit, et utitur illo principio practico: ‘Bonum 
est faciendum’ modo practico. […] Si vero scientia moralis secludat prudentiam et solum tractet de materia 
virtutum definiendo, dividendo etc., est speculativa […], ut in Ethicis et in tota Prima secundae videri potest. 
Et ita bene potest aliquis esse insignis philosophus ethicus et theologus et imprudens peccator.”
26 See Maritain J. (1946), Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, p. 879-
896 (Annex VII).
27 John of Saint Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus. Logica, Secunda pars, q. 27, a. 1, vol. I, 
p. 826-827: “Scientia autem moralis, si sumatur practice, est idem quod prudentia, et sic non pertinet ad 
habitus speculativos, sed practicos, de quibus non agimus in praesenti. Si vero sumatur speculative pro 
scientia ethica, quae tractat de natura virtutum, sic pertinet ad Philosophiam et est pars illius, quia cum 
agat de anima intellectiva, consequenter de moralibus actibus eius debet tractare.”
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Here the author distinguishes ethics, which includes prudentia, not only from 
theoretical philosophy, but from philosophy as a whole.28 As a residuum of the pru-
dential form of ethics there remains only the Secunda secundae, and John does not 
explore it in further detail in his Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus.
Although Wolfgang Kluxen and others have described John’s position as mar-
ginal and somehow beside the point,29 it can hardly be considered an exceptional 
idiosyncrasy, as has become obvious here. Rather, it reflects the final conclusion of 
a development that is intrinsically connected with the transformation of ethics into a 
science in the Middle Ages.
Conclusion
The authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ultimately confirm that from 
the perspective of an Aristotelian theory of knowledge and science it is difficult to 
speak of a “practical science” or of a “science of action”.30 However, instead of 
challenging the status of ethics as a scientia these early modern authors decided to 
relinquish prudentia and with it the practical dimension of the science of ethics, thus 
paving the way for a form of ethics which understands itself as a purely theoretical 
science.
Although this endeavour is contentious, it has undoubtedly maintained its rel-
evance in contemporary debates. One might think here first of all of the controversy 
between the representatives of two meta-ethical models which Otfried Höffe has 
aptly labeled the theoretical and moral models of ethics.31 Since the dispute between 
Julius Walter and Gustav Teichmüller at the end of the nineteenth century, the rela-
tionship between ethics and prudentia has been at the heart of this debate.32 Walter 
and others33 followed along the lines established by Vitoria and John of Saint Thomas 
28 Jacques Maritain tried to avoid this consequence in his reading of John of Saint Thomas. See Maritain, 
Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir, p. 881. However, his interpretation on this point has been 
unanimously dismissed; see the discussion in Palacios E.L. (1944), “Juan de Santo Tomás y la ciencia 
moral,” Revista de estudios políticos 18, p. 557-570.
29 See Kluxen W. (1998), Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin, 3rd ed., Felix Meiner Verlag, 
Hamburg, p. 43: “Johannes steht mit dieser Auffassung ziemlich allein.”
30 Lutz-Bachmann, “Praktisches Wissen und ‘Praktische Wissenschaft’,” p. 91.
31 See Höffe O. (1996), Praktische Philosophie. Das Modell des Aristoteles, 2nd ed., Akademie Verlag, 
Berlin, p. 24-28.
32 See Walter J. (1874), Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen Philosophie, Mauke, 
Jena, as well as Gustav Teichmüller’s reply: Teichmüller G. (1879), Neue Studien zur Geschichte der 
Begriffe. Vol. III: Die praktische Vernunft bei Aristoteles, Perthes, Gotha.
33 For example Frank E. (1940), “The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle,” American Journal of 
Philology 60, p. 34-53 and 166-185, in particular the concluding remark p. 183.
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and strictly separated ethics and prudentia, thus ultimately constructing ethics as a 
theoretical discipline, whereas Teichmüller and later René A. Gauthier34 agreed with 
the medieval authors surveyed here on an integrated concept of ethics and prudence, 
with the latter granting the practical character of ethical knowledge.
Although it is impossible to analyze the controversy here in every detail, the 
historical survey of the problem presented above allows at least the following con-
clusion: for an appropriate understanding of prudentia as part of ethical reflection, 
in particular with the possible aim of rehabilitating it for contemporary practical 
philosophy, we have to review critically the epistemological foundation of practical 
philosophy and its status as a science. As the previous analysis has shown, it is the 
epistemological status of ethics as a science which led to an increasingly marginal 
position of prudentia. Prudentia is removed whenever authors exaggerate the scien-
tific character of ethics, thereby risking to loose its genuinely practical nature.35
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